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ease."' 4 The strong language contained in this quoted passage seems to
point out that the classification of the local mental hospital had no little
influence on the court's decision. Perhaps this was even the decisive
factor, though from the wording of the opinion, the court is placing its
decision on the disapproval of a procedure previously approved by a
higher court in its own circuit.
Michael R. Bradley
EQUITY-INJUNCTION-FEDERAL COURT UNDER DUTY To RESTRAIN
STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING WHERE IRREPARABLE INJURY TO A
NATIONAL INTEREST Is THREATENED.
United States v. Wood (5th Cir. 1961).
Prior to July, 1961, John Hardy, a resident of Tennessee, came
to Mississippi for the purpose of organizing Negroes in Walthall County
to register and vote. On September 7, 1961, Hardy was the victim of a
battery committed by the local registrar, who acted without just provoca-
tion. The local sheriff, upon hearing of the incident, arrested Hardy
for disturbing the peace. Prior to Hardy's trial, the United States Attorney
General applied to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi for a temporary restraining order, so that a hearing
might be had on its motion for a preliminary injunction of this state
criminal prosecution. The United States alleged, as a basis for its appli-
cation for injunction, that the continued prosecution of Hardy would
intimidate qualified Negroes in Walthall County from attempting to register
to vote. It was asserted that this threatened intimidation constituted an
injury which the United States could enjoin under the authority of the
Civil Rights Act. The District Court denied the application and the
government appealed. The Court of Appeals, reversing, held that, under
the circumstances, the denial of the temporary restraining order was a final
decision which was appealable, and that not only did the government's com-
plaint state a claim for relief, but that the District Court was obliged to
issue a temporary restraining order. United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d
772 (5th Cir. 1961). 1
are mentally fit to stand trial - and also those who are found not guilty by reason
of insanity at trial, in an attempt to cure them.
14. Tremblay v. Overholser, supra note 3, at 571. The view of the court as
expressed in this quoted passage may possibly cast some light on the District Court's
disposition of this case in a manner opposite to the Circuit Court's holding in the
very similar Lynch case.
1. Before reaching the merits of the present case, the court was confronted with
a difficult procedural question involving whether the decision of the District Court
was appealable as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958) or as an inter-
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Federal courts rarely enjoin state court proceedings of any kind,
particularly criminal prosecutions.2 In fact, except in a few instances, federal
courts are specifically prohibited from granting injunctions to stay state
court proceedings.3 However, in Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States,4
in which the United States successfully enjoined state civil proceedings
in order to protect federal property rights, it was held that section 22835
does not apply when the United States is the party seeking the injunction
and the stay is sought to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a national
interest. Although the Leiter Minerals case has been criticized for diluting
the effect of section 2283 in order to strengthen the tentacles of federal
supremacy, the decision has endured.6 Further, in Cooper v. Hutchinson,7
it was decided that a federal court was empowered to enjoin a state judge
from proceeding in a criminal action in which out-of-state counsel for de-
fendant had been arbitrarily dismissed. The force of this decision, how-
ever, was successfully diverted by staying the injunction long enough to
give the state court an opportunity to rectify the patent deprivation of civil
rights. Additionally, it should be noted that the section itself excepts
locutory order refusing an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1958). As to whether
section 1292 was applicable, the court noted that this section has been interpreted toinclude only orders denying, modifying, or continuing injunctions and not those
denying temporary restraining orders. St. Helen v. Wyman, 222 F.2d 890 (9thCir. 1955); Mesabi Iron Co. v. Reserve Mining Co., 270 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1959);Pennsylvania Motor Truck Ass'n v. Port of Philadelphia Marine Terminal Ass'n,276 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1960). However, the court did conclude that, under the
circumstances of the instant case, the denial of a temporary restraining order couldbe considered a final decision and, hence, was appealable. Section 1291 provides:
"The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may behad in the Supreme Court." The words "final decision" have generally been given aliberal rather than a strict, technical interpretation. See in this context Cohen v.Beneficial Industries Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949), where the
Court said that a "practical," rather than a "technical," construction of section 1291
should be used; United States v. Cerforalti, 202 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ("liberal and
reasonable," rather than "strict and technical"). But see Berman v. United States,302 U.S. 211, 58 S. Ct. 164 (1937) (narrow technical construction preferred).Adopting a liberal construction in Sears Roebuck v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 76
S. Ct. 895 (1956), two tests were found to determine when an appeal may be
taken before completion of the litigation: when failure to grant an appeal wouldpreclude any effective review or when it would result in irreparable injury. Thepresent situation clearly fulfills the first requirement. If appeal is now denied, the
state court machinery will resume functioning, and Hardy's trial will at leasthave begun (and perhaps been completed) before a formal hearing on the petition
for an injunction could be obtained. Consequently, the question whether the trialitself was an intimidation device and part of a general scheme of harassment will have
been mooted. Further, the good faith allegation by the United States of irreparableharm demands an effective hearing, especially since the assertion appears far fromfrivolous. But, once the trial has begun, a subsequent finding that it has caused
irremediable damage would be meaningless.
2. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908); Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S. Ct. 877 (1943).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958): "A court of the United States may not grant aninjunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments."
4. 352 U.S. 220, 77 S. Ct. 287 (1957).
5. Supra note 3.
6. 10 VAND. L. Rv. 864 (1957).
7. 184 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1957).
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those instances in which Congress has expressly authorized the issuance
of an injunction.' In Douglas v. City of Jeannette,9 a suit brought by
private individuals, an injunction was sought to restrain threatened criminal
prosecution on the ground that the statute which formed the basis of the
prosecution was unconstitutional. The Court denied injunctive relief,
asserting that no individual should be immunized from prosecution in good
faith for his alleged criminal act. It was pointed out that the constitutionality
of a statute could be determined as well in a criminal trial as in a suit for
injunctive relief. In the instant case, the United States asserts that Hardy's
prosecution was not only begun in bad faith but was instigated for a
purpose which will allegedly result, if the trial is allowed to continue, in
irreparable injury to a national interest. Assuming this assertion is justified,
it would seem that the United States has established the very situation
implicit in Douglas, that is, where a person is not being prosecuted in
good faith and where only a suit for injunctive relief can effectively
determine the merits of the claim.
The claim in the present case is that the very trial of Hardy is part
of a general scheme of harassment designed to interfere with the rights
of the Negro voters in Walthall County. In United States v. Raines,10
the United States Supreme Court held that the United States had the
power to enjoin the registrars in a Georgia county from discriminating
against Negroes who attempted to register to vote. The Court declared
that ". . . there is the highest public interest in the due observation of all
the constitutional guaranties, including those that bear the most directly
on private rights, and we think it perfectly competent for Congress to
authorize the United States to be the guardian of that public interest in a
suit for injunctive relief."" It is apparent in the instant case that the
United States is acting as the champion of the private constitutional
rights of the prospective Negro voters in Walthall County and that the
injunction is being sought to prevent alleged co-operative intimidation by
the local officials. It is difficult to see any difference in principle between
the registrars' action in depriving Negroes of the right to register in
United States v. Raines and the less direct intimidation in the instant case.
As pointed out in United States v. Raines, the United States is the
proper party to bring this suit, even though it is brought primarily on
behalf of the prospective Negro voters in Walthall County. The basis for
this position is subsections 1971 (b) and (c) of the Civil Rights Act of
1957.12 The Act permits the United States to enjoin any person, whether
8. Supra note 3. It has been suggested that federal courts may have the power
to enjoin state court proceedings under the Civil Rights Act; however, this thought
was qualified by the suggestion that if Congress had so intended, the grant should have
been more specific, as in the Interpleader and Bankruptcy Acts. 74 HARV. L. Rrv.
726 (1961).
9. 319 U.S. 157, 63 S. Ct. 877 (1943).
10. 362 U.S. 17, 80 S. Ct. 519 (1960).
11. Id. at 27, 80 S. Ct. at 526.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1958): "(b) Intimidation, threats, or coercion. No
person . . . shall intimidate . . . or attempt to intimidate . . . any other person for
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acting under color of law or not, from interfering with another's right to
vote. Since registration is a necessary prerequisite to voting, intimidation
in regard to the one is certainly interference with the other. Here, if the
government's claim is true, those who, under color of law, unjustifiably
prosecuted Hardy are thereby effecting such intimidation. Certainly, the
claim in the instant case states sufficient cause to warrant a hearing
on the merits; but this will be effectively precluded by a denial of the
temporary restraining order.13
In NAACP v. Alabama,14 the United States Supreme Court declared:
"constitutional adjudication should where possible be avoided. . . . The
principle is not disrespected where constitutional rights of persons who are
not immediately before the Court could not be effectively vindicated except
through an appropriate representative before the Court." In the instant
case the United States asserts its right under the Civil Rights Act to obtain
an injunction to protect the interests of citizens who are not immediately
before the Court but whose rights are allegedly at stake. The situation
appears analogous to that in Morrison v. Davis.15 There, certain Negroes
obtained a declaratory judgment pronouncing a state statute, which re-
quired certain segregative practices, unconstitutional. The Court, after de-
termining that protection of civil rights was made a federal cause of action
by Congress, reasserted a portion of the trial court's opinion: "It is not the
Court's view that in our civilization it is necessary to have incidents re-
quiring arrests to have the rights of people declared. These plaintiffs
are not being prosecuted; they have not violated the state law ... they are
seriously affected by the provision of the statute ... it is not even apparent
that they could put themselves in position to be arrested and prosecuted
even if they sought to test their constitutional rights in that manner, which
we hold they do not have to do."' 16 Clearly, the prospective Negro voters
in Walthall County, indirectly the plaintiffs in the instant case, have not
violated state laws nor are they being prosecuted. It is asserted that they
will be seriously affected if Hardy's prosecution is permitted. Hardy's
trial with its deterrent effect on registration, is no different in principle
from the statute in the Morrison case which discriminated against Negroes
solely because of their race or color. In both cases personal liberties were
the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote. . . . (c) Pre-
ventive relief; injunction; costs. Whenever any person has engaged or there are
reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or practice
which would deprive any other person of any right or privilege secured by sub-
section (a) or (b) of this section, the Attorney General may institute for the
United States, or in the name of the United States, a civil action . . . including
an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other
order."
13. Also inherent in the forecasted harm is the deterring effect Hardy's trial
will have on the Negro citizens in Walthall County who are not yet qualified to vote.
At best, they are presented with a rationalization for their disinterest and, at worst,
a stimulus to remain unqualified.
14. 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 1170 (1958).
15. 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958).
16. Id. at 103.
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